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A War on Two Fronts:
Race, Citizenship, and the Segregation of
the Blood Supply during World War II
Joshua Jordan
Human blood carries with it much more than cells, platelets, and plasma—it is a substance of intense scrutiny in medicine and public health, a liquid representation of the fluidity of
socio-cultural stigmas, norms, and values. Enlightenment scholars
believed blood “to be the seat of the soul.”1 In ancient Egypt
and medieval Europe, blood was a symbol of youth and longevity. And in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a new element
became tangled up with blood: race. Less than three decades after
Darwin published his paradigm shifting tome, On the Origin of Species, his cousin Francis Galton coined the term eugenics, labeling
it as a field that would give “the more suitable races or strains of
blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable.”2 Early eugenicists tied blood to their theoretical principles.
Eugenics became concerned with “improving” the human race by
studying how traits could be passed on (or prevented from being
passed on) to future generations, often in a way that justified racial,
gendered, and class-based prejudice.3 Although it had its critics,
through most of the first half of the twentieth century eugenics
was a popular field, well-regarded by scientists and laymen alike.4
Blood was no longer a physical substance, but a potent symbol of
lineage, race, and citizenship.
By the twentieth century, blood gained an additional layer
of symbolism as the practice of transfusion became commonplace. Blood transfusion did not become an accepted therapeutic
treatment until the nineteenth century, as it directly conflicted with
the centuries-old practice of bloodletting to cure disease.5 While
blood transfusion was only sporadically performed in that century,
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Karl Landsteiner’s discovery of ABO groups in 1901 led to its
more commonplace use in the twentieth century.6 However,
blood transfusion was still quite rare before 1914, used only in
the most severe cases due to its low success rate. In 1914, particularly during World War I, a coagulating agent called citrate
was first employed. This allowed blood to last longer in transport, resulting in transfusions being performed on a larger scale
than before.7 At this time, civilian blood donation was still not
an accepted practice, and blood was typically provided by other
soldiers in return for rewards like extended leave.8
In the 1920s, voluntary, non-compensated donation became the standard, but collection efforts remained uncoordinated and existed in only a few select cities and hospitals. The U.S.
government did not establish a national-level blood collection
program until 1940.9 As a result, the Red Cross launched a major
civilian blood collection program in 1941.10 When Dr. Charles R.
Drew, an African American man, developed new plasma-drying
technology that allowed blood to be transported across states
and oceans, blood could more regularly be transfused from one
human to another on a mass scale. The symbolism around blood
began to take new forms. What did it mean now that one person’s blood could easily and anonymously flow into the veins of
another? In the United States, at a time when racial segregation
was rampant, the practice of blood transfusion brought to the
fore a new trajectory of discourse regarding blood and race.
Using an array of primary sources, from local periodicals and advertisements to internal letters and memos from the
Red Cross and the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP), I will trace the evolution of this
segregation policy and the calculated actions of the Red Cross
as it found itself caught between two sides of a burgeoning
American war on racial segregation. Scholars such as Thomas
Gugliemo argue that the Red Cross had a poor understanding
of public opinion and that its actions instead reflected many
of their own race-based prejudices.11 While the Red Cross did
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indeed have difficulty reflecting public opinion, the organization understood that it could never precisely mirror it. Instead,
it chose to take a middle ground approach so as not to anger
either side of the debate and rise above racial politics. The Red
Cross placed great value on its symbolism and the quasi-religious
space it had carved into the psyche of the American public. In
an attempt to act as a supranational, post-political humanitarian force, even an embodiment of American democracy itself,
the Red Cross promoted segregation as a social rather than scientific policy, a “democratic compromise” between two wholly
conflicting views on race. Meanwhile, local Red Cross chapters
and everyday American citizens often found themselves deeply
misinformed about the policy and its origins for the duration of
the war. Year after year, the Red Cross found itself pulled into
the messy weeds of American racial politics by fierce opponents
of segregation, from the NAACP to religious leaders and labor
groups, unable to truly function as the apolitical humanitarian
organization it sought to be.
I will close with a discussion on the implications of this
policy of segregation on the perception of citizenship in the
African American community. Sarah Chinn, in her book Technology and the Logic of American Racism, traces how the rhetoric of
Red Cross officials and Red Cross advertisements contributed
to an erasure of black citizenship.12 I will build from this concept while digging more deeply into the responses of everyday
black citizens to better understand their own perceptions of the
implication of this debate. The stakes were further raised due to
the backdrop of World War II, a war fought against a German
aggressor obsessed with ethnic purity and the racial symbolism
of blood. Due to the Red Cross’s policy of blood supply segregation, black Americans felt unable to fulfill their patriotic duties,
unable to contribute to their country and its war efforts as full
and equal citizens. In this way, black Americans became caught
in a second symbolic war on the home front just as the United
States found itself fighting in a fierce battle against racialized
34
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ideology abroad.
Shifting Responsibility and an Evolving Policy:
Surveying the Red Cross Policy’s Trajectory
As U.S. citizens started to donate blood for the war effort, even before the formal entrance of the United States into
World War II, some black donors reported being turned away
by the Red Cross. At first, the Red Cross, which collected blood
for Allied troops, did not have an official national policy on accepting black donors. In some local centers, such as those in
Philadelphia and New York, the blood of African Americans
was accepted but not sent to the laboratory for processing. In
other locations, such as Baltimore, black donors were turned
away from the war blood donation program, and were redirected
to the regular Baltimore-area hospital transfusion program.13
By late August, due to the continued media publicity
and the new recommendations from the army and navy, the Red
Cross made it its official policy to reject black blood completely.14
The national director of the Red Cross’s Blood Donor Service,
G. Canby Robinson, specified that “pursuant to the requests
and instructions of the Army and the Navy, and up to this time
the Red Cross has been asked to supply only plasma from white
donors.”15 The justification for this policy was that it would be
“impractical” to accept blood from multiple races due to limited
need and limited processing resources.16 This identical language
can be found in several letters and statements sent from various
Red Cross figures to concerned citizens and organizations.17
The Red Cross included this exact language in their manual as well. All local Red Cross chapters received a widely disseminated guide entitled “Team Work from Publicity to Plasma.”
This guide instructed local chapters on how to conduct publicity
efforts and served as an all-inclusive manual containing official
Red Cross collection procedures and policies. The guide explicitly stated that “only white donors can be taken,” again stating
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that they were “acting pursuant to the requests and instructions
of the Army and Navy.”18 The guide, however, went into additional detail:
This position is taken because about ninety-five
percent of those serving in the armed forces are
white men, who it is understood prefer plasma
from white donors. Where transfusions are required for Negro service men, they will be given
normal transfusions from Negro donors if they
do not desire to use the plasma from white donors. In this way a person would have the right to
receive blood transfusions of the proper type, or
plasma, as he himself might choose.19
Shortly afterwards, the NAACP became involved in the
blood supply debate, viewing it as an opportunity to spread its
message of anti-segregation and racial equality. In December
1941, Walter White, the secretary of the NAACP, forwarded G.
Canby Robinson’s official statement to the secretary of the navy
in order to put pressure on Robinson and receive clarification
on the policy. By January 15 of the next year, the navy had received the note and Surgeon General Ross T. McIntire penned
a reply. McIntire denied that the war department had ever been
involved in the formulation of the Red Cross’s policy. “So far as
the Navy is concerned,” he began, “I wish to tell you that it has
never requested the American Red Cross not to take blood from
black donors.”20 McIntire described the Red Cross’s statement
as “based upon misinformation,” noting that black donors had
donated to the navy’s supply as recently as December 31, 1941.21
In an effort to ascertain the Red Cross’s actual policy,
Walter White did not hesitate to challenge the Red Cross upon
receipt of the letter of denial from the navy. White forwarded
the navy’s letter to the Red Cross and also sent it to numerous
publications around the country. In one letter sent by White, he
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attached the letter from McIntire and wrote, “I know this will interest you in its proof that the Red Cross has been guilty not only
of race prejudice but also of falsifications.”22 The Red Cross,
suddenly caught in an unexpected public relations predicament,
explained in a letter from their director of domestic operations:
“the publicity which grew out of the letter…is something we
had no opportunity to deal with because we did not know that
Admiral McIntire had written the letter.”23
In order to dampen the effect of White’s actions following the published letter from the navy, Red Cross National
Chairman Norman H. Davis replied to White in a letter on
January 26, 1942. He wrote: “It is true…that the Navy never
actually requested the Red Cross to refuse to take blood from
Negro donors,” adding the caveat that the navy had told them
that there was “no need for Negro blood.”24 Upon hearing from
the navy that there was no particular need for black blood, the
Red Cross decided only to take white blood, calling it “impractical” to set up separate facilities for collecting black blood. In
the same letter, Davis noted that due to facilities that had “considerably expanded” and because of a need for civilian transfusions, “arrangements have been made…to accept the blood of
Negro donors.”25 Davis continued to mention the navy like this
in subsequent statements explaining this new policy, although
he softened the language considerably. The policy was no longer
“pursuant to the requests and instructions of the Army and the
Navy,” but now “in agreement with the Army and the Navy.”26
Attached to this letter was an official statement from
January 21 in which Davis presented the new Red Cross policy to
accept blood from all races, but always labeled by race and “processed separately into plasma.”27 This new policy was developed
in a conference that included the chairman of the Red Cross and
the surgeons general of the army and navy. At the conference, it
was decided that “there was complete agreement that neither the
Red Cross, nor the Army or the Navy could accept responsibility for mixing the [white and black] blood…It was recognized,
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of course, that this position would probably be attacked just as
vigorously as our practice to this time of not accepting Negro
blood.”28 This new policy was an attempt at a compromise to appease both sides due to its political implications.29 Despite the appearance that this policy compromise incorporated the thoughts
of the army, navy, and the Red Cross, the Red Cross continued to
attempt to diffuse blame in both public and private statements.
In an off-the-record note to a colleague, Robinson wrote that
“[i]f we were instructed not to indicate Negro blood as such [by
the army and navy], we would not do so.”30 It is clear that neither
the Red Cross, army, nor navy wanted to take full ownership of
the policy, contributing to the confusion surrounding it for many
years. Davis even acknowledged in private correspondence that
he “repeatedly told representatives of the Negro point of view,
that the decision to keep plasma separate was really the decision of the Army and Navy and that we were complying with
their request.”31 The national Red Cross was “unwilling to have
the Red Cross placed in the position publically of appearing to
disapprove a War Department policy,”32 yet at the same time it
believed that desegregating the blood supply would lead to “a
storm of criticism far more difficult.”33
Believing that taking a firm opinion in either direction
would result in severe controversy, the Red Cross attempted instead to strike a sort of balancing act with its policy and national
statements, neither fully accepting ownership of the policy nor
fully opposing segregation. The organization kept attempting to
shift responsibility to other parties. In 1942, it worked to modify
legal language so that “the actual title to the whole blood will
pass from the Red Cross to the Army at the time it is delivered
to the processing firm,” essentially removing culpability from the
Red Cross. Davis explicitly stated that, as a result, “the entire
matter of the handling the blood and processing it into plasma
will be after the Army has assumed control so that it will be
more accurate for us to contend that we really have nothing to
do with whether the white and Negro plasma is mixed or kept
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separate.”34
Despite the Red Cross’s best efforts to tamp down negative publicity, activists saw the policy as an outright extension of
Jim Crow racial segregation laws to the blood supply, institutionalized by the Red Cross’s new blood donor policy.35 The news of
this new policy was disseminated widely, even appearing in a New
York Times article on January 29, 1942.36 The paper’s coverage
was relatively negative, featuring a quote from a New York congressman who declared the policy “abhorrent to the principles
for which this war is being fought and on which this country was
founded.”37
The muddled and inconsistent responses from both the
national Red Cross and the military meant that the true origins
of this policy were unclear to everyday citizens for many weeks,
months, and even years. While the navy had already denounced
the Red Cross’s statement and many local chapters appeared to
be actively accepting donations from black citizens, one union
publication informed its members on January 22, 1942, that
the Red Cross still barred donations from black donors per the
army and navy’s requests.38 The origins of the policy were also
unclear to many citizens throughout the span of the war.39 This
confusion led to organizations like the National Federation for
Constitutional Liberties accusing the Red Cross, army, and navy
of “repeatedly [attempting] to shift responsibility” for the policy,
noting that even in April, the Red Cross continued to claim that
the segregation policy was done “in accordance with [the Navy’s]
desires.”40 Throughout the entire length of the war, the NAACP
continued to receive letters from citizens who were confused
about this policy and its origins.41
Blood is Blood: Scientific and Medical Consensus
against Blood Supply Segregation
While local justification for the policy of segregation
was fragmented and often uncoordinated, the national Red
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Cross organization was more consistent. As discussed in the first
section of this work, each time the national Red Cross updated
its official policy, which was quite infrequently, statements were
brief and contained little justificatory detail. However, other
sources such as quotes from national Red Cross employees and
editorials provide a better window into understanding how the
Red Cross justified its segregation policy publically and on a national scale.
Some scholars have written off the Red Cross’s segregation policy as a practical decision based on social norms without
fully acknowledging the extent of the controversy or the amount
of time the Red Cross spent agonizing over the policy.42 Other
contemporary scholars have attempted to understand early
twentieth-century attitudes towards non-white blood through a
lens of science and public health. Historian Keith Wailoo has
extensively studied the way that African American blood was associated with certain diseases such as sickle cell anemia during
the first half of the twentieth century. He explains that, by viewing the blood of African Americans as a medium through which
sickle cell was carried and spread, some physicians justified existing social views of segregation with the scientifically dubious
mentality that African American blood was inherently infectious
or unclean. Despite a general consensus that sickle cell anemia
was genetic, many physicians still believed that any exposure to
black blood carrying sickle cell anemia, regardless of the genetic
makeup of the recipient, could spread the disease.43
Yet, it is striking that the Red Cross did not employ any
of this medical or public health rationale to justify this segregation policy during World War II. In fact, most of the major players involved in this debate, from the Red Cross to the government to the NAACP, seemed to agree that there was no apparent
scientific or public health rationale to segregate the blood supply.
A representative from the Chicago chapter of the Red Cross explained in a letter to the Chicago Civil Liberties Committee that
all blood at the time was tested for disease and type before being
40
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processed into plasma. He emphasized that “if [a donor’s] blood
is tainted with disease, he is notified that his blood is unsatisfactory” and the blood would be rejected and not processed into
plasma. Since all blood was rigorously tested, the Red Cross did
not fear contamination. Rather, it was primarily concerned with
the health of the donor, regardless of race.44
Waldemar Kaempffert, the former president of the
National Association of Science Writers, explained that despite
the higher rate of diseases like syphilis in the African American
population, any risk was negligible due to the mandatory testing
of all donated blood. He then stressed that “thousands of whites
who have received Negro blood are alive today because there is
no difference [in blood between races].”45 Red Cross National
Chairman Norman H. Davis likewise told protesters that “he
recognized the scientific fact that there is no difference between
the blood of Negroes and whites,”46 and Lt. Col. Kendricks of
the Army Medical Corps agreed “that there is no scientific basis
for segregation.”47 Journalists and activists also emphasized that
“there is no chemical or physical difference between the blood
of colored persons and the blood of other races.”48 The cartoon
in Figure 1, created by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE),
is a variation of a common image used by activists in flyers and

Figure 1
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newspapers, employing this scientific consensus alongside nationalist pathos to protest the Red Cross’s segregation policy.
In fact, when the Red Cross referenced science, it was
actually to say that segregation was inconvenient. In 1941, a representative from the Red Cross stated that since “technical procedures require mixing the blood of donors in processing dried
plasma…it is impractical to keep separate the blood of particular
individuals in this process.”49 The national technical consultant
of the Blood Donor Service called the segregation policy “a very
difficult problem from a technical point of view.”50
Expanding Stakeholders: Blood Segregation and the Social
Status Quo in the Red Cross’s Public Statements
The Red Cross, acknowledging that science would not
be sufficient to segregate the blood supply, instead used the
idea of “popular will” as an expression of democracy to justify
their policy. When the Red Cross announced that they would
no longer ban black blood but would still segregate the blood
supply, in an official statement on January 21, 1942, they gave
only the following justification: “In deference to the wishes of
those for whom the plasma is being provided, the blood will be
processed separately so that those receiving transfusions may be
given plasma from blood of their own race.”51 This argument
proved to be highly contentious. Representative Vito Marcantonio (ALP-NY) believed that “this policy of segregating the
blood of black and white donors does not represent the wishes
of the American people.”52 One World War I veteran wrote to
the NAACP soon after learning of the Red Cross’s policy. He
was extremely “troubled,” explaining, “I know that if I needed
a pint of blood I would not care where it came from if it would
help me.”53
Nevertheless, the Red Cross’s primary justification
throughout the war remained the same. They never named any
disinclinations from within the organization but rather deferred
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to other groups, such as the army and navy leadership, soldiers,
and, more generally, “whites.” While the army and navy had
originally denied any involvement in the segregation policy, a letter in 1943 from Lt. Col. Kendricks admitted that the military
was, in fact, involved. He explained that “there is a disinclination
on the part of many whites…to have colored blood injected into
their veins,”54 without referencing any specific data or particular instance of a soldier refusing non-white blood. A group of
NAACP officials interviewed J. Harrison Heckman, manager of
the North Atlantic division of the Red Cross. He admitted that
“soldiers and sailors had never been asked and would not be.
The wishes were those of the surgeons general of the army and
navy who…were not apt to need any transfusions.”55 In agreement with this statement, there were few to no public objections
from soldiers themselves on this issue, but rather objections
from non-soldiers who projected their opinions onto soldiers.
One congressman, Representative John E. Rankin (D-MS), was
particularly outspoken. In 1944, Rankin announced that “there
are many Southern white troops with the Allies and I resent having the blood of other races pumped into their veins when they
are helpless to do anything about it.”56
S. Sloan Colt, national chairman of the Red Cross’s War
Fund Program, made the argument used by the Red Cross even
more general, applying it to white and black Americans as a whole
rather than just white and black soldiers. He outlined this in a letter to a doctor who questioned the policy. The main paragraph
of his letter illuminates the expanding group of stakeholders in
this debate:
It is recognized that there are many persons in
this country who object to having Negro blood
used for the transfusion of white persons…
When this situation is accepted it seems that the
feelings and perhaps even the prejudices of individuals to whom transfusions are given should
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be respected as a symbol of democracy. Neither
the American Red Cross nor the Medical Departments of the Armed Forces have considered
that this feeling can be disregarded.57
This argument is a natural extension of the way that the Red
Cross often viewed itself—as an embodiment of democracy.
Red Cross pamphlets described the organization as “democracy
in action—the people’s exemplification” and a “fusion of…diverse points of view,” even claiming that “[d]ynamic American
democracy [is] on the march under the Red Cross emblem.”58
Various arguments were employed to justify the ban and segregation of African American blood from the Red Cross blood
supply. Tracing this language shows that the arguments were no
longer solely about white and black soldiers, but about white and
black Americans across the country. Consequently, it is more accurate to label the debate over the blood supply a societal one
rather than one isolated to the Red Cross and the army alone.
Because the Red Cross employed the broader societal
argument that whites did not feel comfortable with the blood
of African Americans being transfused into white soldiers, it
is important to understand why they used this justification, regardless of the veracity of the claim. What made the Red Cross
concerned about the opinions of white Americans at large rather
than just the opinions of white soldiers?
Many in the Red Cross and the military believed that the
viability of the Red Cross’s blood collection operation depended
on the support of white America, much of which was resistant to social change. The Red Cross frequently expressed the
concern that desegregating the blood supply would be a direct
challenge to the United States’ “social order.” In 1942, a group
of Mid-Atlantic social workers were unhappy that they had to
comply with the Red Cross’s policy of segregation. Walter Davidson, assistant manager of the Eastern Division of the Red
Cross, defended the policy by stating: “we have not yet reached
44
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the place in society which would permit radical social changes.”59
The aforementioned Congressman Rankin likewise criticized a
newspaper opposed to blood supply segregation for “[stirring]
up race friction” rather than “[promoting] national unity.”60 To
critics like Rankin, desegregation represented an unnecessary
social battle that would distract from the war.
Even supporters of desegregating the blood supply understood that desegregation would alter current social mores.
They, however, saw this as a positive rather than a deleterious
alteration. For example, a white donor wrote in a letter to the
Chicago Daily Tribune that desegregating the blood banks would
be an important “stepping-stone” towards a more equal social
order. This donor argued that segregation may very well have
been part of the entrenched social structure in certain parts of
the United States, but that the Red Cross was actually “extending” the reach of segregation into a new sphere, not simply preserving what already existed.61
Statements from the Red Cross and the U.S. military suggest that they viewed objects to desegregation with concern and
feared that desegregation could distract from their main goal:
blood collection. Lt. Col. Kendricks explained that “whether that
disinclination is the result of ignorance or prejudice, it nevertheless exists…It is the conviction of this office that disregard of
this feeling would greatly mitigate against the successful conclusion of the program for collecting blood plasma for the armed
forces.”62 Similarly, Red Cross official J. Harrison Heckman said
off the record in his interview with the NAACP that the Red
Cross would only change the policy if the blood supply somehow depended on it. He admitted that the organization received
many letters from concerned citizens who did not support the
policy, in addition to complaints from nearly a hundred committees, but asserted that the Red Cross was “getting all the blood
[they could] handle.”63 According to statements like this one, the
organization did not mind the many complaints and bad publicity, since it was not hurting their donation numbers in the end.
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In other words, the Red Cross appeared to be mostly concerned
with its steady supply of donations rather than accusations of
racial discrimination. Yet this claim was likely not fully true.
Throughout the war, the Red Cross sent letters to chapters reminding them of the organization’s ambitious collection quotas,
and the Red Cross was acutely aware of negative publicity that
could risk its donation numbers.64
In a letter to NAACP cofounder Mary White Ovington,
G. Canby Robinson continued to use this practical justification
for their policy. He explained that the Red Cross enacted the
original ban because they feared it “would be detrimental to the
whole undertaking.” Robinson also stated that his organization
had to listen to the “prejudices of a relatively large number of
people in this country,” as it would be “in the best interests of
the Army and Navy from the point of view of successful procurement of dried plasma.”65 Even officials from the NAACP
were concerned about the views and opinions of racially motivated white Americans. NAACP officials in the Publicity and
Promotion leg of the NAACP feared publishing the words of
Representative Rankin’s racially tinged tirade due to the fact that
“too many people agree with Rankin and might be persuaded by
the full text that he was right.”66 Even the official “authorized
reply” that the national Red Cross distributed to local chapters
used language emphasizing the success of the blood donor program. This authorized reply, referring to critics of integration,
stated: “we have no alternative but to recognize the existence of
a point of view which, if disregarded, would militate against the
effective use of the blood plasma.”67
“The People’s Exemplification”:
The Red Cross as a Force “Above” Politics
The national Red Cross’s extensive concern over the
language of democracy, public opinion, and interfering with the
social order of the United States reflected a larger trend in the
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Red Cross’s continuing predicament with regards to segregation. Throughout its history, the organization often struggled to
reconcile its own guiding principle of neutrality with the fact
that its interventions inevitably had political ramifications.68
The Red Cross has historically been extremely preoccupied
with transcending national politics, branding itself as an extragovernmental, almost religious force that rose above everyday
political conflict. Yet, during World War II, segregation dragged
the organization into the minefields of the explosive and divisive
national politics of race.
The Red Cross was consumed on a day-to-day basis with
its public image, particularly with cultivating a post-political image. In one piece of publicity material, the Red Cross called itself
“the people’s exemplification” and “the Greatest Mother”—an
amalgamation of all members of the United States, a representation of “city and country people, rich and poor, white and Negro,
capital and labor, agriculture, Protestant, Catholic, Jew.”69 The
organization continued to cultivate this sort of quasi-religious
embodiment of democracy in this same document, describing
how all of these diverse segments of the United States, “by the
alchemy of the Red Cross emblem…become one people.”70
The Red Cross often accused its critics of undermining
this self-constructed post-political image and muddying it with
matters of local race politics. In a letter to the New York Times
after the publication of an article criticizing the Red Cross’s segregation policy, the director of the New York chapter of the Red
Cross accused the paper of “knowingly [seeking] to discredit
the American Red Cross or injure an undertaking so vital to
the welfare of our armed forces,”71 and explained that the Red
Cross policy was constructed for the sole purpose of “the alleviation of suffering and the conservation of human life,” calling
racial controversies “beyond the scope of the Red Cross.”72 A
newspaper article from the same year noted that one of the Red
Cross’s “favorite” public arguments was “that it is not its business to settle racial controversies.”73 Indeed, in one letter the Red
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Cross secretary explained that “[t]he Red Cross was not created
to settle racial questions.”74 The Red Cross believed that it was
beyond these political matters of race. As a result, the Red Cross
continually attempted to dodge blame for the policy and justify
its actions with the vague language of public opinion in an effort
to sustain its image as an embodiment of democracy.
For the duration of the war, the Red Cross was continually preoccupied with matters of public opinion. Each year from
1942 until 1946, the Red Cross commissioned Gallup polls in order to gauge public opinion. These polls were national in scope.
Notably, the polling results were classified as confidential. The
polls referenced other competitor relief organizations such as
the Salvation Army, and the Red Cross believed that this “might
be considered controversial.”75 In its effort to classify these polls,
the Red Cross was again attempting to maintain an air of partiality and apoliticism, above inter-organizational squabbling.
The Red Cross saw the importance of maintaining positive public relationships with the black press and black America
more broadly, as criticisms from the black press would inevitably bleed into the consciousness of the white reading public.
One national Red Cross employee wrote in an internal letter:
“The press has so frequently called the attention of the colored
reading public to what it alleges to be discriminatory practices
on the part of the Red Cross that the average lay citizen reads
and examines every publication that is published in the name of
the American Red Cross with critical eyes.”76 Another employee
noted that “practically all of the complaints [sent to the national
Red Cross] related to the separation of the blood from white
and Negro donors.”77 The national organization believed that
the segregation of the blood supply represented one of the Red
Cross’s major obstacles in transcending politics and matching
public opinion.
It became apparent to members of the national Red
Cross that because of the issue of segregation, it would be impossible to perfectly match public opinion and fully transcend
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national politics. The Red Cross could neither appease segregation-supporting whites nor appease America’s black population
with any single policy. Jesse O. Thomas, assistant to the vice
chairman of domestic services to the Red Cross, described this
predicament in a frustrated letter to the Red Cross’s public relations department:
It will be difficult to make any statement that will
stand up against critical analysis and yet maintain
the position we occupy…It is a controversial
question in which we find ourselves essaying
to reflect public opinion. I am not sure that we
know what is the public’s opinion. Under these
circumstances we will have to assume that our
opinion is the public’s opinion…If no white
Americans choose to go with [the Negro]…he
could not threaten our security nor could his
unsympathetic attitude do us much harm. Of
course if the labor organizations and a considerable section of the white community should join
him in protest, it would create a somewhat different situation. Only a Solomon could be wise
enough to give the answer.78
A War on Two Fronts:
Blood Supply Segregation and War Rhetoric
For many Americans, the stakes of the debate over the
blood supply were significantly heightened due to its concurrence with World War II. In Europe, Allied troops were fighting
against a dictator obsessed with blood purity and erasing nonwhiteness. Opponents of the Red Cross were not hesitant to
draw parallels between that organization and the Axis powers.
The NAACP drew these parallels quite frequently, viewing this comparison as a point of weakness that could be used
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to pressure the Red Cross and draw a war-engulfed public to the
anti-segregation side. In December 1941, when black blood was
still totally banned, the NAACP issued a press release utilizing
this sort of war rhetoric against the Red Cross. The press release featured Dr. James J. McClendon, president of the Detroit
branch of the NAACP, who stated that he saw “very little different between the Hitler-like tendencies in Germany and the
Hitler-like tactics of the American Red Cross in refusing to take
Negro blood.”79 McClendon then utilized more wartime rhetoric, calling it “deplorable that democracy should maintain such
inconsistencies during this time of national emergency” and
adding that “the need for national unity should overshadow the
prejudices which the Army and Navy persist in maintaining.”80
Since the Red Cross used an argument of personal preference
as an expression of democracy, the NAACP and other critics
viewed this as an opportunity to reverse the language and use it
against the Red Cross to portray it as “undemocratic” or “unAmerican.” This specific press release makes significant use of
these themes, with one paragraph as a particularly salient representation of the NAACP’s overall rhetorical strategy:
We feel that in a national emergency, such as this,
we can ill afford to practice the same undemocratic principles that Hitler and Mussolini are
practicing overseas. We understand that we are
fighting against racial hatred, bigotry, and totalitarianism. It seems rather strange to us that if we
are fighting against those things, why we should
practice them here at home.81
The NAACP continued to use very strong anti-Axis
language in its writings. Walter White, in a letter to Chairman
Davis, excoriated the policy. He wrote, “how ironic must be the
laughter today in Berlin and Tokyo as they listen to American
assertions that the war is being fought against the racial ideology
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of aryanism and to wipe out totalitarianism based on racial bigotry.”82 In its letters and press releases of this nature, the NAACP
was relentless and continuous. Over three years later, almost immediately after Davis was replaced by Basil O’Connor as Red
Cross chairman, the NAACP released a press release calling on
the new chairman to immediately reverse the blood segregation
policy. The statement noted that “our Axis enemies have used
this policy of segregation to convince colored peoples of the
world that our country is not sincere when it says that it is fighting against the racial theories of Adolph Hitler while at the same
time it practices a similar master race theory.”83
While this language may at first appear to be overly
dramatic, comparing the Red Cross and America’s genocidal
opponents was fairly common, even among those who did not
work for the NAACP, such as Red Cross volunteers and donors.
Mabel K. Staupers, the executive secretary of the National Association of Colored Graduate Nurses and famous opponent
of the racial segregation of nurses in the armed forces,84 made
this comparison in a letter to the Red Cross. In her letter, she
included a “small donation” and noted that she had “been trying very hard to get other donations but the Red Cross attitude
towards Negroes in relation to the Blood Bank has been most
disastrous.”85 She closed her letter with a criticism of the Red
Cross through war rhetoric similar to that of the NAACP: “This
recent announcement of labeling the blood—Negro and White
is adding insult to injury and I am sure that it must give great
satisfaction to the Totalitarian Powers who in their attitude towards minority groups have claimed that they are copying the
American Pattern.”86 Stauper’s statement added a financial element to the war rhetoric, explaining that the segregation policy
was undermining the Red Cross’s fund collection efforts.
Even the famed American poet Langston Hughes used
war rhetoric to put pressure on the Red Cross. In a letter to the
Red Cross War Fund Authors’ Division, Hughes wrote: “Hitler
could hardly desire more. General Douglas MacArthur may be
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right when he says, ‘The Red Cross never fails a soldier.’ Certainly it has failed thirteen million Negroes on the home front,
and its racial policies are a blow in the face to American Negro
morale.”87 Hughes forwarded the letter to his acquaintance Walter White of the NAACP, who lauded it.
In another letter to the Red Cross, Dr. Ephraim Kahn,
president of a New York association of medical students and
physicians that offered assistance to the Red Cross, used similar
language. Noting the “scientific stupidity” of the segregation
policy, Kahn wrote, “We are Americans engaged in a bitter war
with those tyrants who seek to foist barbaric race theories upon
the world, and as such we are indignant at the undemocratic and
fascist implications of your policy.”88 Another letter writer, the
executive secretary of the Urban League of Cleveland, claimed
that the segregation policy would actually prolong the war by
dividing the allies and creating “obstacles to that real national
unity without which our struggle may be unnecessarily long and
bloody.”89 These two quotes take the war rhetoric used in previous examples even further, actively accusing the Red Cross of
undermining national unity and hurting the war effort, not simply critiquing them for promoting racist policies.
A column in the weekly newsletter of the Greater New
York Federation of Churches compared Hitler’s “doctrine of
Aryan blood supremacy” to the Red Cross’s policy of blood
supply segregation.90 Likewise, an article in the Jewish newsletter
The Reconstructionist called it “a sin against democracy to keep alive
the myth of racial characteristics inherent in the blood stream,”
built upon “Nazi mythology of Aryan preeminence.”91 Another
religious figure, Henry Smith Leiper, complimented the Red
Cross’s efforts in a letter but wrote that he felt “that the situation
is intolerable at a time when we are fighting Hitlerism with its
grotesque race theory, the central item in which happens to be
in complete accord with the nonsense about racial blood that is
perpetuated here through such policies.”92 From religious figures
and NAACP members to concerned everyday civilians, letters
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with war rhetoric put pressure on the Red Cross from a diverse
array of backgrounds.93
E. Frederic Morrow, NAACP field secretary and future
major in the army, wrote a letter to the editor of the Bergen Evening Record, a New Jersey newspaper, making an emotional call
to fight this war on race on multiple fronts. It is an example that
takes these rhetorical strategies to the extreme, comparing not
just the Red Cross with the Germans, but more broadly applying the debate over the blood supply to racial injustice across
the United States and the world. It shows not only the powerful
rhetorical strategies used by the NAACP and others to put pressure on the Red Cross, but also alludes to the emotional stakes
of this policy battle and its implications for millions of black
citizens in all spheres of American society. It sheds light on why
the NAACP made this blood supply policy one of the organization’s main ideological battlegrounds of World War II:
As we go, we want our citizens conscious that
we cannot defeat Hitlerism leaning on the black
crutch of invidious color distinctions in our national life. We want America to realize that we
can win the war abroad, but lose it at home, unless we simultaneously crush the little Hitlers and
their fascist tendencies here in this land. We want
honest agreement that if pogroms are wrong
in Poland, so are lynchings wrong in America.
If forced labor is an evil in Czechoslovakia, so
are peonage farms in Georgia. If badges of racial distinction are damnable in Germany and
France, so are Jim-Crow arrangements in the
United States. This fight for freedom for people
everywhere must start right here at home. And
the time is now!94
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Blood Donation as a Lens for
Understanding Black Perceptions of Citizenship
During World War II, the Red Cross was a familiar
household name, found in all corners of popular media. The
publicity wing of the national Red Cross was extremely active,
even creating sample advertisements to send to local newspapers
for publication.95 The national organization developed publicity
guides along with cartoons, stories, photo spreads, testimonials,
and other forms of advertisement so that local chapters could
work with local newspapers to advertise for blood donation.96
Newspapers and radio shows, from local radio stations to popular periodicals like Parents’ Magazine, Ladies’ Home Journal, Town &
Country, and Redbook, regularly announced when organized Red
Cross blood drives were taking place and ran ads, articles, and
shows encouraging readers/listeners to donate blood.97 It was
not uncommon to read an article about a group of colleagues

Figure 2
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taking a break during the working day to donate blood.98 One
Cincinnati radio station began to air a weekly Sunday night series that would “include dramatizations from the home and war
fronts” to encourage listeners to donate to the Red Cross.99 A
Chicago radio station did the same three times per week.100 Another Baltimore station aired a similar nightly program where
“listeners [were] urged to call in during the broadcast and verbal arrangements [were] made over the air for the blood donations.”101 Broadcasts and radio programs like these could be
found around the country.102
Advertisements explicitly used the Red Cross to promote their products. An advertisement for Julianna housecoats
in Vogue told readers that “a half-hour in a rest-inducing Julianna
housecoat will restore you to normal after your Red Cross blood
donation.”103 In Billboard magazine, J.P. Seeburg Corporation, a
Chicago musical instrument maker, bought a full-page advertisement encouraging everyday citizens “to give all that is humanly
possible in work…in bonds…in blood donations…in all patriotic activities…until a final Allied Victory is achieved.”104
To activists, the ubiquity of the Red Cross in the consciousness of everyday Americans—due to popular media,
government propaganda, and otherwise—provided an opening
for fighting segregation in a space that was very familiar to the
American public. To black Americans, this ubiquity represented
a direct challenge to their citizenship. Advertisements telling citizens it was their duty to donate blood were extremely commonplace, yet black Americans were told they could not contribute
on this front; they were either barred from donating or had their
blood segregated in the process.
One poster (Figure 2) directly compared fighting in battle and donating blood. It read: “He gave his blood. Will you give
yours?” Another poster (Figure 3) used the language of recruitment to encourage citizens to donate blood, telling donors to
“Enlist…As a Red Cross Blood Donor,” just as a soldier would
“enlist” in the war. Posters like these demonstrate that donating
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blood was a contribution equated with fighting in battle. One
article in Vogue magazine told readers that “your blood is in the
war” and that “in your arteries is the power to give men a second chance to live,” directly comparing donors to soldiers on the
battlefield and encouraging them to donate.105 Since blood donation was so often described as having near equivalent importance
to physically fighting in battle, the blood donation restrictions on
African Americans represented a direct challenge to their ability
to contribute to the war in the same way that white Americans
could.106
Blood segregation became a very visible and widespread
issue for African Americans. The NAACP considered it one of
its top concerns with the Red Cross. Secretary White emphasized
that until blood plasma was desegregated, everything else “would
be futile in winning the goodwill of Negroes, so stirred are they
by the segregation of Negro blood.”107 On July 15, 1942, the Red
Cross brought black leaders from across the country to the organization’s Washington headquarters. At this conference “it was
made clear to the Red Cross administrators that the segregation
of Negro blood in the blood plasma project was the principal
thing affecting adversely the Negro’s morals today.”108
This ban caused such a visceral response from black
Americans because it deprived them of the chance to serve their
country. The contributions of African Americans, if not outright rejected, were labeled and marked separately in a way that
showed that even in their blood they were not equal citizens and
could not give to their country like white Americans could. As
described by E. Frederic Morrow, African Americans “want, and
demand all the responsibilities, as well as privileges of citizenship.”109 The segregation of the blood supply diminished these
responsibilities.
After donating, one African American man heard that
black blood was being rejected and wrote to the Red Cross. He
said he hoped they would accept his blood, “by an American
for the use of Americans.”110 Black workers at the New York
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City Department of Welfare described to the NAACP how “the
establishment of a discriminatory blood donor station in offices where whites and Negroes work together is embarrassing
and humiliating.”111 In another instance, the NAACP followed a
group of African Americans who hoped to donate their blood
only to be rejected. One woman, the president of the American
Federation of Teachers, stated that she was “humiliated” by not
being permitted to donate.112 Dr. James J. McClendon described
how his patients and friends, many of whom were teachers, attempted to donate their blood “for the American Soldier,” only
to be rejected. He described them as “fine, loyal, American colored people” who were “insulted and humiliated” by the ban.113
In another instance, Alva B. Johnson, an administrator
of a historically black college in West Virginia, described how
he was perturbed by a message in the weekly newsletter of his
hometown of Langhorne, Pennsylvania. The message called on
“all white patriotic citizens who wish to donate blood report to
the Community House at a certain date,”114 with no announcement following regarding black blood donors. Johnson was particularly bothered by the fact that the announcement referred to
the community house, a public building. This correspondence
raises the broader question of what it means to be part of a community. Articles such as this one excluded African Americans
from the perceived community, a smaller instance of the larger
issues raised by the segregation of the blood supply.
One element that heightened the stakes of the debate
was the fact that blood donation practices regarding race changed
once the United States entered a state of war. One letter from a
New York City hospital explained that before the war they performed “at least 1,400 transfusions each year,” all of which were
done “without regard to race or color.”115 Then suddenly, during
a time of war, millions of African Americans were banned from
doing what they had always done. When the stakes moved from
aiding fellow private citizens to contributing on a larger scale to
the country’s war efforts, African Americans were banned from
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doing so and later segregated from participating fully. It was no
longer just about donating blood, it became a matter of the government excluding “more than ten per cent of its population
from the opportunity to join in giving their blood to save our
way of life.”116 In many ways, the segregation of the blood supply paralleled the fight against segregation in the armed forces.
Just as those at home hoped to contribute to the war effort
through blood donation but were either banned or segregated in
the process, many black men were turned away from the armed
forces, and those who did enter lived and operated in segregated
conditions, often in service rather than fighting units.117 In her
book Black Soldiers and Civil Rights, Christine Knauer argues that
the relegation of black men to service roles “was a manifestation
of black men’s perceived inferiority”118 and that “the claim for
full and equal citizenship…was deeply interwoven with military
service.”119 She argues that as these soldiers returned home, they
carried back with them their mistreatment, “[spurring] black activism.”120 The fight over the segregation of the blood supply
was in many ways the translation of this issue to the home front.
Just as their brothers and fathers were fighting for the right to
shed blood abroad in the name of their country, so too were
many fighting for the exact same right at home. The denial of
the right of black Americans to contribute on all fronts during
the war only intensified the battle over segregation in the country
in the years leading up to the civil rights movement.
It is evident that the Red Cross did not segregate the
blood supply out of an explicit desire to promote racial segregation in American society. Rather, the organization saw segregation as the path of least resistance in an effort to collect blood
for wounded Allies while simultaneously promoting itself as a
humanitarian organization above the fray of everyday politics.
The Red Cross’s ultimate desire was to embody American democracy. In doing so, it co-opted one of the country’s deep
institutional racial injustices by perpetuating American society’s
dark traditions of segregation. The Red Cross was not acting in
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a sinister, coordinated effort to oppress black Americans, but
rather was subtly perpetuating structural racism on a vast scale
through what was ostensibly a noble effort to save lives. In the
twentieth century, African Americans were linked to the diseases
of syphilis and sickle cell anemia, which affected the way that
African Americans were treated. In the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries, AIDS has often been closely associated with
gay men—it was and still is often referred to as a gay disease or
gay-related disease.121 There are deep connections between the
segregation of the blood supply in the 1940s and modern-day
bans on blood donation. Jessica Martucci, in her article “Negotiating Exclusion,” explains that “keeping the blood supply safe
in America has always been a process of donor exclusion,”122 but
with varying repercussions over time. She closes her article by
claiming that “there is something unquestionably powerful about
the claim of biological citizenship that makes the biomedical and
health policy realm an increasingly active one for making citizenship claims.”123
While the plight of African Americans in the 1940s as
it relates to the blood supply is in no way fully comparable to
modern-day examples, it is impossible to ignore the parallels and
to not consider the deeply powerful symbolism of blood donation and what it means to participate in society with all of the
privileges and responsibilities of a full citizen. A quote from an
article in the National Medical Association’s 1942 publication by
its president provides a powerful perspective on the societal and
emotional stakes of blood donation:
[T]hese thirteen millions of Negroes… are loyal
to the core. They along with other citizens of
this country, know that for them as for whites, to
lose this war means that all is lost that is worth
living for. They are ready and willing to sacrifice
the very extreme in helping to win the war. There
is a big difference between bodily and spiritual
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service. The body and the spirit should go together. Such acts as [the blood supply segregation] kill the spirit. They wound the very soul.124
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